For a game with positive profit, the optimal proportion of investment required to continue investing without borrowing is uniquely determined by an integral equation for each price. For a game with parallel translated profit, the ratio of the optimal proportion of investment to its price has some invariance properties. The optimal price of a game with parallel translated profit converges to its expectation divided by e to the riskless interest rate for a certain period.
Introduction
A game (a(x), F (x)) would imply that if the investor invests 1 dollar, then he or she receives a(x) dollars (including the 1 dollar initially invested) in accordance with a distribution function F (x) that is defined on an interval I ⊆ (−∞, ∞) such that I d(F (x)) = 1. For each positive price, in order to continue investing without borrowing, the optimal proportion of investment must be in (0, 1] (see [4, 5, 6, 7] ). In Section 2, we will investigate a game with parallel translated profit (a(x) + n, F (x)).
For simplicity, we will omit the currency notation. It is assumed that the profit function a(x) is measurable and non constant (a.e.) with respect to F (x). In the absence of confusion, we use dF to represent d(F (x)) and employ the following notation: E := I a(x)dF, H := I 1/a(x)dF, ξ := ess inf x∈I a(x), H ξ := I 1/(a(x) − ξ)dF . In this paper, we always assume that ξ > 0. If a(x)=ξ dF > 0, we define H ξ = ∞ and 1/H ξ = 0. Since a(x) is non-constant, we have ξ ≤ ξ + 1/H ξ < 1/H < E (see [4, Section 2 and Lemma 3.5]).
For each u ∈ (ξ + 1/H ξ , E), the pre-optimal proportion t u ∈ (0, u/(u − ξ)) is uniquely determined by the equation I (a(x) − u)/(a(x) t u − u t u + u)dF = 0 (see [4, Section 3] 
For each u ∈ (ξ + 1/H ξ , E) and t ∈ (0, u/(u − ξ)), the pre-growth rate G u (t) is defined by exp I log (a(x)t/u − t + 1) dF ) (see [4, Section 4 ] ). We always assume that G < ∞, which implies that a(x)>1 log a(x)dF < +∞ (see [4, Lemma 4.3] ). G u ( t u ) has the following properties: (1) G u ( t u ) is continuous and strictly decreasing ([4, Lemma 4.9 and Theorem 4.1]); (2) For each u ∈ (1/H, E), the optimal proportion of investment is equal to t u , and the maximized limit expectation of the growth rate is equal to G u ( t u ).
For each u ∈ (0, 1/H ], the optimal proportion of investment is equal to 1, and the maximized limit expectation of the growth rate is equal to exp( I log a(x) dF )/u.
If the riskless continuously compounded interest rate r > 0 for a period is given, the optimal price of a game can be uniquely determined by the equation such that the maximized limit expectation of the growth rate is equal to e r (see [4, Section 6] ).
Parallel translated profit
For a game with parallel translated profit (a(x) + n, F (x)) (n > −ξ), we use underlined notations such as a(x) = a(x) + n, E = E + n, H = I 1/a(x)dF, ξ = ξ + n and H ξ = I 1/ a(x) − ξ dF . Example 1. Suppose that the profit a or b (0 < b < a) occurs with the probability p or 1 − p (0 < p < 1), respectively. From
which is independent of n.
Lemma 2.1. G < +∞, if and only if G < +∞.
Proof. If G < +∞, then from a(x)+n>1 log(a(x)+n)dF = 1−n<a(x)≤|n|+1 log(a(x)+ n)dF + a(x)>|n|+1 log(a(x) + n)dF ≤ log(2|n| + 1) + log 2 + a(x)>1 log a(x)dF , we have G < +∞. The remaining can be verified in a similar manner.
Proof. By definition, we have I (a(x) − u) / (a(x) − u) t u+n + u + n dF = 0, which is equivalent to I (u + n) / (a(x) − u) t u+n + u + n dF = 1. By differentiating them, we obtain
3)
Since these functions are analytic with respect to u (see [4, Lemma 3 .1] and [8, Chapter VIII]), we have ∂ t u+n /∂n − t u+n /(u + n) = 0 or ∂ t u+n /∂n = 0 as a constant function. If ∂ t u+n /∂n = t u+n /(u + n), then ∂ t u+n /(u + n) /∂n = (u + n)∂ t u+n /∂n − t u+n /(u + n) 2 = 0, which implies t u+n /(u + n) = t u /u. If ∂ t u+n /∂n = 0, then t u+n = t u , particularly, t 1/H+n = t 1/H . Since t 1/H+n = t 1/H = 1 = t 1/H and t u+n is strictly decreasing with respect to u, we have 1/H = 1/H + n, which contradicts the fact that 1/H − n is strictly increasing with respect to n (see [5 , the proof of Lemma 1.1]).
(2.5) Therefore, the conclusion is obtained form the proof of Theorem 2.2.
It should be noted that the difference
Proof. By definition, we have
Thus, using [5, Lemma 1.1], we derive the conclusion.
Proof. The conclusion is derived from the fact that G 1/H ( t 1/H ) = H exp I log (a(x) + n) dF , lim n→∞ nH = lim n→∞ I n/(a(x) + n)dF = 1, and
Let r > 0 be the riskless continuously compounded interest rate such that e r < G 1/H (1). The optimal price u r ∈ (1/H, E) of a game (a(x), F (x)) is then uniquely determined by the equation e r = G ur ( t ur ) (see Lemma 1.1 and [4, Section 6]). Theorem 2.6. u r = u r + n, if e r < min( G 1/H (1), G 1/H (1)) and n > −ξ.
Proof. By definition we have G ur ( t ur ) = G u r ( t u r ) = e r . From Theorem 2.3, we observe that G ur +n ( t ur +n ) = G ur ( t ur ). Based on the uniqueness of price u r , we obtain u r = u r + n. 
Example 2. Suppose that the profit 1 or 19 occurs with each probability 1/2. Then, using Example 1, we have E = 10, H = 10/19, ξ = 1, H ξ = ∞, E = 10 + n, H = (n + 10)/((n + 1) (n + 19)), G u+n ( t u+n ) = 9/ (u − 1)(19 − u), G 1/H ( t 1/H ) = (n + 10)/ (n + 1)(n + 19), n > −1, and 1 < u < 10.
Let the riskless continuously compounded interest rate r be 0.05. Then, as e r 1.051 < G 1/H (1) 2.294, the equation e r = 9/ (u − 1)(19 − u) deduces the optimal price u r = 10 − 9 √ 1 − e −2r 7.224, which is considerably different from E/e r 9.512. By the equality e r = (n 0 +10)/ (n 0 + 1)(n 0 + 19), we have n 0 = 9e r / √ e 2r − 1 −10 19.175. Therefore, if −1 < n < 19.175, then u r 7.224 + n (Theorem 2.6).
In the case where n = 99 > 19.175, the optimal price u r is determined by e r = exp ( I log (a(x) + n) dF )/u r . Thus, u r = (n + 1)(n + 19)/e r 103.330, which is considerably close to E/e r 103.684, as suggested by Theorem 2.7.
